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Abstract - The paper explores some fundamental aspects of a 
Political Economy of Land such as the definition of rights and 
duties in legal and ethical terms. The increasing demands of 
sustainability introduces the need of a critical analysis of this 
institution with the purpose to explain and improve the present 
discussion that pursue alternative forms of appropriation and 
use of natural resources such as land. The responsibility 
involved in property rights and, thus, its conception in 
reciprocal terms, is present in some of the most important 
works of economic thought, namely Classical Political 
Economy and Old Institutionalism. These theories present 
important insights to the conception of land and its 
exploitation. The analysis of the legal rules that define 
property rights in the Portuguese case stresses the rights and 
duties involved in property. Besides Law, a Political Economy 
of Land should consider Ethics, namely Land Ethics. 
Therefore, the paper presents an essay for the analysis of 
property rights trough economic, legal and ethical concerns 
envisaging the design of a Political Economy of Land. 
Keywords - Political Economy of Land, property rights, 
institutions, Law and Economics, Land Ethics  
1. Introduction: a Multidimensional Study of 
Property Rights  
Nowadays we face an opportunity and an urgency to 
reflect on property, the institution that provides control over 
natural resources such as land, which in part derives from 
the demand for sustainability and multifunctionality of 
agricultural production. In the Portuguese case, as in other 
developed countries, problems of desertification and the 
frequency and dimension of forestry fires are additional 
factors. 
The reflection on landed property presented in this 
paper considers Economic Thought and its interface with 
Law and Ethics, namely Land Ethics. 
The contributions of Economic Thought in the analysis 
of land, property, and, in some cases, landed property, recall 
the conception of these aspects in terms of their 
instrumental value (material progress) but also in terms of 
its broad meaning, including the power associated legal 
rights, that is landed property rights. The interdisciplinary 
perspective adopted highlights the responsible and 
reciprocal nature of property rights in contrast with an 
absolute view of this institution, dominant in some 
socioeconomic contexts. 
Having this in mind, the paper proposes an 
interdisciplinary approach to property through the 
consideration of contributions of Economic Thought (part 
two), the articulation between Economics and Law (part 
three and four). Part five concludes by presenting the 
importance of going deeper in interdisciplinary approach to 
property through the consideration of an ethical perspective, 
namely Land Ethics 
2. Responsibility and Reciprocity in 
Private Property  
Classical liberal thought presents the institution of 
property as a responsible and worthy one, stressing its 
relative nature. 
In Locke, for instance, the defense of natural property 
rights is associated with labor and founded on “natural” and 
“moral” limits.  
The former are imposed by nature and defined in a 
context of abundance: 
 
“Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, 
by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, 
since there was still enough and as good left, and 
more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in 
effect, there was never the less left for other 
because of his enclosure for himself”. (Locke, 
1823: 118)  
 
The “moral” limits derive from the charge that every 
man should have regarding its possessions:  
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“Whatsoever then, he removes out of the State that 
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his Labour with, and joined to it something that is 
his own, and thereby makes his Property. […]. For 
this ‘labour’ being the unquestionable property of 
the labourer, no man but he can have a right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there is 
enough, and as good left in common for others”. 
(Locke, 1823: 116) 
 
“God has given us all things richly. […]. But how 
far has He given it us ‘to enjoy’? As much as any 
one can make use of to any advantage of life before 
it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a 
property in. Whatever is beyond this is more that 
this share, and belongs to others. Nothing was 
made by God for man to spoil or to destroy”. (Id.: 
117) 
 
In Locke’s view, the introduction of money, social 
conventions and government, and, thus, the substitution of 
one state of “plenty” by one of “scarcity”, changes the 
natural limits but not the moral ones. These are expressed in 
concern of interest, the abstention of prejudicial actions and 
should continue to inspire the social conventions that 
regulate property.  
If labor explains the formation of property rights “at 
the beginning”, the conventions allow its regulation in the 
next phases of historic evolution. However, the principles 
that inspire it steel remain. According to Locke: 
 
“[…] For as a man had a right to all he could 
employ his labor upon, so he had no temptation to 
labour for more than he could make use of. This 
left no room for controversy about the title, nor for 
encroachment on the right of others. What portion 
a man carved to himself was easily seen; and it was 
useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself, or 
take more than he needed”. (Id: 126) 
 
Smith’s considerations on property involve a criticism 
of some of the norms that defined it, namely inheritance 
law, which difficult the development of small property and 
the land market.  
The criticism of inheritance norms is also present in 
Say, Malthus and Mill’s works, all of them supporting 
measures aimed at improving the performance of the 
property institution in terms of economic progress but also 
in terms of social justice.    
The specificity of land advocated in these classical 
works justified some of the conclusions regarding its 
appropriation. In Says view, for instance, land provides a 
productive service – “le service productive de la terre” – 
that gives utility to a set of natural materials. Being possible, 
the appropriation of natural elements does not involve, 
however, absolute rights because: 
 
“It is not the landowner that permits the nation to 
live, to walk and to breathe in his lands: it is the 
nation that permits the landowner to cultivate the 
soil, which she recognises as its owner, and does 
not concede to anyone in an exclusive way the 
enjoyment of public places, big roads, lakes and 
rivers”. (Say, 1803: 532)  
 
The specificity of land is also presented by Malthus. 
According to him, land is a “God’s gift” or “nature’s gift”, 
explaining land surplus with the reference to “that quality of 
earth”.   
Ricardo diverges from the other classics in this realm. 
According to him, the surplus or rent is explained by its 
scarcity, not mysterious forces of nature. Land is a resource 
like any other in Ricardo’s view. 
Stuart Mill criticisms of property (“the primary and 
fundamental institution”) law, especially inheritance, are 
very vigorous and are justified by the specificity of land 
resources, in opposition with Ricardo’s approach.  
Responsibility and merit are the values that should inspire 
property. Thus, Mill’s approach to this institution goes 
beyond mere efficiency and includes ethical and social 
dimensions of concern. The following comments illustrate 
this aspect of Mill’s thought: 
 
“Even in the case of cultivated land, a man whom, 
though only one among millions, the law permits 
to hold thousands of acres as his single share, is not 
entitled to think that all this is given to him to use 
and abuse, and deal with as if it concerned nobody 
but himself. The rents or profits which he can 
obtain from it are at his sole disposal; but with 
regard to the land, in everything which does with 
it, and in everything which he abstains from doing, 
he is morally bound, and should whenever the case 
admits be legally compelled, to make his interest 
and pleasure consistent with the public good. The 
species at large still retains, of its original claim to 
the soil of the planet which it inhabits, as much as 
is compatible with the purposes for which it has 
parted with the remainder”. (Mill, 1848: 235) 
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Moral references about property are present also in 
classical political economics critics as well as in its heirs.  
Among the former, one should mention Marx’s view 
one private appropriation of land:  
 
“From the point of view of a higher economic form 
of society, the private ownership of the globe on 
the part of some individuals will appear as absurd 
as the private ownership of one man by another. 
Even a whole society, a nation, or even all societies 
together, are not the owners of the globe. They are 
only its ‘possessors’, its users, and they have to 
hand it down to the coming generations in an 
improved condition, like good fathers of families”. 
(Marx, 1867: 101) 
 
Among the latter, it is important to mention Marshall 
and Walras.  
In his references about landed property, Marshall 
adopts a poetic style and stresses the moral and aesthetic 
qualities involved in agriculture.     
To Walras, the appropriation of scarce things is 
something that should be considered in the context of Social 
Economics, which is the domain of the interindividual 
relations, distinct from the domain that analyses the relation 
between man and materials – Pure Economics. In the case 
of land, concerns of social justice would justify its 
nationalization. In his own words: 
 
“The fact that land is a thing and that, to this 
extent, it may belong to people, that is human 
beings, is something that we can understand. But 
why not to everyone, to all men in a collective 
manner? Why only to some people, to some men 
individually? Why to John more than to Paul? Why 
to you rather than to us? This is something that is 
for us completely impossible to understand”. 
(Walras, 1896: 33-34) 
 
“Land does not belong to all men of one 
generation; it belongs to humanity, that is, to all of 
human generations […]. In legal terms, the 
humanity is the owner and the present generation it 
usufructuary“. (Id.: 219) 
   
In spite of these social and moral considerations, the 
purposes of objectivity and scientificity oriented Economics 
in other direction. In neoclassical view, the maximization 
calculus is the only criteria for decisions concerning the use 
of resources. The absence of institutions analysis in 
neoclassical framework introduces the necessity to consider 
alternative economic approaches.  
The study of norms and conventions that influence the 
control of resources needed for human livelihood is central 
in the works of American institutionalists, namely Veblen 
(1857-1929) and Commons (1862-1945).   
Commons reflections on property emphasize formal 
norms, namely legal ones. According to him:  
 
“The changes in the meaning of the economic 
equivalent of property as assets and liabilities have 
made necessary a deeper analysis of the meaning 
of the term rights as used in jurisprudence”. 
(Commons, 1934: 17) 
 
In his efforts to clarify the concept of rights, Commons 
specifies that a “right” always presupposes a correlative 
duty, it is legally protected and should not be confused with 
privileges, uses, etc. Besides this correlative dimension, 
rights involve also reciprocal duties according to Commons 
view: 
 
“An authorized right cannot be defined without 
going in the circle of defining its correlative 
(corresponding) and exactly equivalent duty of 
others. One is the ‘I’ side, the other is the ‘you’ 
side, one the beneficial, the other the burdensome 
side of the identical transactions. […]. […] there is 
an equality, that is, correspondence, of one’s rights 
and other’s duties. But at the same time, a right 
cannot exist without some deduction, however 
great or small, by virtue of a reciprocal duty 
clinging to it and diminishing its possible benefits”. 
(Commons, 1934: 131) 
 
Like correlativity, the notion of reciprocity introduces 
a dynamic perspective of rights involved in property, 
because:  
i) It introduces the idea of limit that is present in rights, 
stressing their relative nature - there are no absolute 
rights; 
ii) It defines the space of individual decision as one 
which is influenced by collective action presented in 
norms, namely legal norms;    
iii) It allows the view of individual decision as 
encompassing (also) duties. 
 
The idea of responsibility associated with the 
appropriation and exploitation of resources in classic and 
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marginalist thought is analogous to that of reciprocity in 
Commons work. Both notions – responsibility and 
reciprocity - express the relativity of rights as a consequence 
of duties that individuals must and should observe regarding 
the possession and exploitation of things, namely land.  
Besides Commons, the importance of legal rules in 
rights definition has also been stressed by Coase and his 
heirs (Property Rights School) as well as other 
institutionalists like Hodgson, according to whom: 
 
“Individual property is not mere possession; it 
involves socially acknowledged and enforced 
rights. Individual property, therefore, is not a 
purely individual matter. It is not simply a relation 
between an individual and an object. It requires a 
powerful, customary and legal apparatus of 
recognition, adjudication and enforcement. Such 
legal systems make their first substantial 
appearance within the state apparatuses of ancient 
civilization. […]. Since that time, states have 
played a major role in the establishment, 
enforcement and adjudication of property rights”. 
(Hodgson, 2002: 122) 
 
The consideration of formal rules provides an 
understanding of the boundaries involved in decisions 
regarding the use of resources and presupposes the 
following ideas:  
 
 “Property matters”; property is a central institution 
in economic life and should be explained;  
 Property corresponds fundamentally to (legal) 
rights and duties involved in resources allocation in 
terms of correlativity and reciprocity;   
 The legal norms that define the rights and duties 
are not unchangeable; their permeability to external 
changes should, however, consider the specificity of 
the legal system as well as the capacity to transform 
social values into protected (legal) rights. 
 
3. Reciprocal Rights and Duties in Land 
Law – the Portuguese Case 
The consideration of legal norms is present in the 
critical analysis of three components of the Portuguese legal 
system: 
 The Constitution; 
 The Civil Code; 
 Diverse legislation in the areas of 
Environment, Territory, Ecology and Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
As far as the Portuguese Constitution concerns, the idea 
of reciprocity is present in the possibility of introducing 
restrictions on “fundamental rights” and is a consequence of 
the adequacy of rights with the economic, social and 
political aspects of the Constitutional project, which:  
 
“[…] implies a narrowing of the scope of powers 
traditionally linked to private property and an 
acceptance of restrictions (to the benefit of state, 
collectivity and other individuals) of the liberties of 
use, fruition and disposition”. (Canotilho e 
Moreira, 1993: 333) 
In fact, it is possible to identify some explicit and 
implicit constitutional restrictions to property rights 
involving land.  In explicit terms, these restrictions are 
fundamentally related with the possibility of expropriation 
of land in specific situations. In implicit terms, one should 
mention the restrictions introduced when property rights 
clash, for instance, with the right to “environment and 
quality of life”. According to the authors quoted above:  
“The protection of the environment may justify 
restrictions to other constitutionally protected 
rights. Thus, for instance, the freedom to build that 
is commonly considered inherent to the property 
right, is nowadays conceived as a ‘potential 
freedom to build’, because it can only develop in 
the context of legal norms which include those of 
environmental protection”. (Id.: 348) 
 
The Portuguese Civil Code presents the scope of 
property rights – use, usufruct and disposition - as well as 
other fundamental norms that contribute to its definition in 
terms of estate access, neighbourhood relations, 
abandonment situations and other agrarian issues.  
In Portugal, it seems that the absence of an explicit 
reference to the “social function” of property constitutes an 
obstacle regarding the resolution of conflicts around land 
uses. There is considerable evidence of this in cases related 
with the “right to build” on land integrated in the National 
Agricultural Reserve. In this context, the discussion related 
with the potential clash between property rights and the 
“right to environment” has been presented in a way that 
considers the “rights subject”. According to one of the 
authors quoted above, that “subject” is no longer the 
“person” or “group of persons” but also the “future 
generations”.  Besides, and following the same author, we 
nowadays assist to what he presents as “transfer of the 
problem from the rights arena to one of fundamental 
duties”. In his own words: 
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“We want to stress the need to overcome the 
euphoria of the individualism of fundamental rights 
and the implementation of a community of 
responsibility, of citizens and public entities 
regarding the ecological and environmental 
problems”. (Canotilho, 2005: 48) 
 
The idea of environmentally responsible subjects and 
future generation reminds the conception of land as 
humanity’s inheritance as presented by some of the 
economists considered in this paper and expresses the spirit 
of sustainable development. 
These are values also considered in other legislation 
where the references to sustainability and multifunctionality 
of agriculture production are more frequent. 
The group of diplomas related with “Environment, 
Territory and Ecology” constitutes a paradigmatic set of 
legal rules concerning rights reciprocity. In fact, the 
constitutional possibility that allows restrictions in property 
rights when it collides with other legal protected rights (e.g. 
environmental and ecological). That is the case of National 
Agricultural Reserve, National Ecological Reserve, Nature 
Network, as well as the National Network of Protected 
Areas which represent a significant part of the Continent of 
Portuguese territory. 
As far as the CAP legal diplomas are concerned, the 
discussion around the reciprocal nature of rights has specific 
outlines related to the contractual nature of some restrictions 
as well as with their monetary compensations. This triggers 
criticism on the legitimacy of some CAP measures in terms 
of their genuine attempt to deal with environmental 
concerns and constitutes a peculiar type of reciprocity in the 
exercise of rights because they exteriorize liabilities that 
should be internal to farmers’ decisions.  
Monetary compensations present in some CAP 
measures, on one hand, and the constitution of territorial 
reserves which derive from other group of legal diplomas, 
on the other, correspond to the main instruments in the 
Portuguese legal system related with landed private 
property, namely farm land, in what concerns the 
implementation of environmental and ecological values. 
These instruments shape the reciprocal elements in property 
rights because they involve the definition of duties that 
landowners should observe and exclude, de jure, a 
conception of rights in absolute terms. 
One should not conclude however that, de jure, there 
are no problems in Portuguese Land Law in what concerns 
the implementation of environmental and ecological values. 
In fact, it is possible to identify normative weaknesses and 
inconsistencies, highlighting responsibility regarding private 
property. Besides CAP measures, these fragilities are also 
present in land abandonment legal framework. It is also 
interesting to observe that the absence of an explicit 
reference to property’s “social function” in the Portuguese 
legal system provides the opportunity for various 
interpretations of what seems to constitute a sacred core of 
private property.  
4. Concluding Remarks: Ways of Doing 
Right(s) 
The reference to some economic theories, namely 
classical political economy, allowed the presentation of 
property rights as a responsible and reciprocal institution 
and, therefore, the need to consider the institutions, that is 
the legal rules that define reciprocal rights and duties 
involved in landed property. The analytical approach 
adopted presents an interdisciplinary nature by connecting 
Law and Economics.  
It is important to stress that neither the economic works 
referred, nor the legal norms considered present an absolute 
notion of property. This is an institution that involves rights 
and duties and presents and interdependent nature. 
In certain contexts, however, the property issue is 
difficult to address and it is not easy to interfere in owners’ 
rights. Bromley and Hodge references to occidental farmers 
provide an illustration of this fact. The authors stress the 
conflicts of interests around land use and refer the need of  a 
redefinition of land resources and a change in the status 
quo: 
 
“When the agricultural sector […] resists efforts to 
alter the prevailing property rights position then a 
struggle occurs between the presumed ‘right’ of a 
landowner to do as he/she wishes, and the ‘right’ of 
the members of society to be free from the 
unwanted effects of agricultural land use. The state 
will be under pressure to reflect the interests of 
those adversely affected by the externalities. But, 
given the apparent sanctity of property rights in 
land, any negotiations with the agricultural sector 
will start from a position of political weakness”. 
(Bromley and Hodge, 1990: 199) 
The coexistence of property with other rights that result 
from other social values related, namely, with environment 
and ecology, give rise to questions with no easy questions 
such as: 
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 What are the limits of private property 
restrictions related with other private or public rights and 
interests? 
 Should the restrictions be compensated in 
monetary terms? 
 
Legal norms express a specific pattern of human-nature 
relationship, which is not unchangeable and, therefore, is 
object of reflection towards the definition of articulation 
forms with ecological and environmental values. Therefore, 
and besides Law, Economics should also consider other 
human sciences like Philosophy (Ethics) in the search of 
alternative ways of conception and implementation of 
human institutions that provide the control and the use of 
natural resources. The ethical dimension of property issues 
is present in important works of economic thought as 
already referred.  
The perception of the importance of ethical concerns 
regarding property rights justifies the reference to Land 
Ethics as formulated by Aldo Leopold (1933-1948) in the 
context of the “concluding remarks” of this paper which has 
the purpose to introduce a new challenge in the research of 
property rights issue.  
For Leopold all ethics are based on the idea of 
“individuals belong[ing] to a community of interdependent 
parts”. Land ethic “enlarges amplifies the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, water, plants and animals, or 
collectively: the land” (Leopold, 1949: 204).  
The enlargement of community allows the redefinition 
of the notion of responsibility related with landed property 
as it is associated not only with the fact that land is 
humanity’s inheritance, as some economists uphold, but 
also with the fact that land presents and intrinsic value. This 
approach amplifies the universes of human action that have 
a moral sense and supposes a broad conception of rights and 
duties related with land (Varandas, 2004: 157). The 
following comment of Leopold expresses this 
“revolutionary proposal” (Id.: 155): 
 
“We abuse land because we regard it as a 
commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a 
community which we belong, we may begin to use 
it with love and respect”. (Leopold, 1949: viii) 
 
“[…] a land ethic changes the role of Homo 
Sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to 
plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect 
for his fellow-members, and also the respect for the 
community as such” (Id.: 204). 
 
Land Ethic constitutes a strong and interesting 
analytical path towards a more sustainable oikos. 
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